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The ultimate resolution of this controversy now rests with the United States
Supreme Court which has granted certiorari to the decision of the Ninth
Circuit in the Bank of America casell and the principal case, having been
appealed, has been placed on the summary calendar of that same court. 12
Several areas of conflicting federal-state interests which will have to be
resolved by the court in deciding these two cases are: (1) To what extent is
the federal government to be governed by state law when it loans money in
competition with local agencies and individuals? (2) To what extent has the
federal government submitted itself to state law by Sec. 2410 of Title 28
U.S.C.? (3) Does the federal statute requiring joinder of, and a period of
redemption for the United States imperil the efficacy of state judicial fore-
closure sales and consequently imperil extension of credit by private
agencies? 13
It is submitted that Section 2410 can not be interpreted other than to
pre-empt state law and to require that the federal government be allowed its
statutory 12 month redemption period. Such an interpretation would give
adequate notice to those who would foreclose on property of which the
government has a lien. If the antecedent lien be perfected it will be satisfied
from the sale prior to the claims of the government. 14
 For these reasons it
would appear that the Supreme Court should affirm the decision of the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Bank of America and reverse the holding of the
instant decision.
EDWARD A. ROSTER
Negotiable Instruments—Forged Indorsements—Statute of Limitations.
—Edgerly v. Scintyler. 1—The plaintiffs drew a check payable to a named
payee. The drawee bank paid the check despite a forged indorsement. and
upon discovery of the forgery refused to credit plaintiffs' account since the
drawer depositors had failed to give notice of the forgery 2 or to commence
11 361 U.S. 811 (1959).
12
 Appeal Docketed, No. 565, Kan. Sup. Ct., Dec. 15, 1959. Placed on Summary
Calendar, Feb. 23, 1960, 28 U.S.L. Week 3245.
13
 See MacLachlan, Improving the Laws of Federal Liens and Priorities, 1 B.C.
Corn. & Ind. L. Rev. 73 (1959).
14 It has been held that the United States must in its redemption tender an amount
sufficient to pay off all antecedent liens or suffer its redemptive offer to be adjudged
insufficient. United States v. Brosnan, 264 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1959), First National
Bank & Trust Co. v. McGarrie, 22 N.J. 539, 126 A.2d 880 (1956).
1 113 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1959).
2 § 659.37, Fla. Stat., provides as follows: "No bank or trust company, which
has paid and charged to the account of a depositor any money on a forged
or raised check issued in the name of said depositor, shall be liable to said depositor
for the amount paid thereon, unless said depositor shall notify the bank or trust
company that the check so paid is forged or raised . . . within one year after the
return to said depositor of the voucher representing such payment . . ." 41 States
and District of Columbia have similar statutes.
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suit within the period prescribed by the statute of limitations. 3
 The Circuit
Court for Dade County entered summary judgment for the defendant-bank
and plaintiffs appealed. HELD: The Third District Court of Appeal of
Florida reversed and remanded. The notice provisions of the Florida statute
dealing with forged or raised checks are inapplicable to forged indorsements
and the statute of limitations does not commence to run until the depositor
discovers the forgery.
In holding the notice statute inapplicable, the court relied on the hold-
ing of a number of cases. These cases state that the term "forged check" is
limited to forgery of the maker's signature for the obvious reason that the
drawer knows his own signature, but rarely knows the signature of the
payee and consequently is in no position to tell whether the indorsement
upon the check is genuine or not. 4 The same result has been reached in
jurisdictions which do not have a statute because at common law the drawer
had no duty to examine the returned vouchers for forged indorsements.°
The second and, perhaps, more controversial issue of the case was the
question when the statute of limitations began to run. The Florida court
held that the action was brought within the statute of limitations because the
statute did not begin to run until the discovery of the forgery by the de-
positors or until the depositors would have discovered the forgery if they had
exercised ordinary business care. The majority of courts have taken a con-
trary view to this case and hold that the statute of limitations commences to
run as of the date the bank renders a statement showing the charging of the
amount of the check to the depositor's account.° This view is based on the
proposition that the relation existing between the bank and the depositor is
that of debtor and creditor and that no cause of action arises in behalf of the
depositor until demand has been made upon the bank for the amount of the
deposit. The act of the bank in rendering a statement is a denial of lia-
bility to the extent of the amount of the check and so the necessity of a
demand is dispensed with. The same rule is applied in cases involving
forgery of the drawer's signature.
In rejecting this line of authority, the Florida court relied on the de-
3 § 95.11, Fla. Stat,, provides as follows: "Actions other than those for the
recovery of real property can only be commenced as follows: . 	 . (5) within three
years.—.	 • an action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an
instrument of writing . . . ."
4 McCornack v. Central State Bank, 203 Iowa 833, 211 N.W. 542 (1926) ; United
Motor Car Co. v. Mortgage & Security Co., 13 La. App. 385, 128 So. 307 (1930) ;
Murphy v. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank, 191 Mass. 159, 77 N.E. 693 (1906) ; Board of
Education of Jefferson v. Nat'l Union Bank, 121 N.J.L. 177, 1 A.2d 383 (1938) ;
Kleinman v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 124 Misc. 173, 207 N.Y. Supp. 191 (Sp. Ct. 1924) ;
see also cases cited in Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 1126 (1956).
5 Jordan Marsh Company v. Nat'l Shawmut Bank, 201 Mass. 397, 87 N.E. 740
(1909) ; Shipman v. Bank of State of New York, 126 N.Y. 318, 27 N.E. 371 (1891).
6 Union Tool Co. v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 192 Cal. 40, 218 Pac.
424 (1923) ; Masonic Benefit Ass'n v. First State Bank, 99 Miss. 610, 55 So. 408
(1911) ; Bruce v. First Nat'l Bank, 180 Wash. 614, 41 P.2d 779 (1935) ; Peppas v.
Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 2 Wis. 2d 144, 86 N.W.2d 27 (1957).
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cision in City of New York v. Fidelity Trust Co.,7
 holding that the statute
of limitations does not begin to run against the depositor until he has made a
formal demand on the bank for the money. The reasoning of the court was
that if the statute were to run from the date of the forgery or from the date
the bank rendered a statement showing the amount of the check charged to
the depositor's account, it might result in the claim being barred before the
depositor knows of the forgery.
The rule set forth by the Florida court which deviates only in conclu-
sion from that of New York appears to be the better rule because under the
New York view the depositor might withhold demand and perpetuate his
cause of action for an indefinite period. This deficiency of the New York
rule could be avoided by requiring a timely demand by the depositor.
While it is true that the drawer may not know of an invasion of his
legal rights until the forged indorsement is actually discovered, it seems
harsh to hold the drawee bank to strict accountability to the depositor where
the forged indorsement is not discovered in the course of the drawer's busi-
ness. Many years might elapse before the bank is called to account and it
would seem that the bank could be forced to reimburse the drawer although
the drawer's own liability to the payee had been blocked by the statute of
limitations affecting actions on debt. Moreover, the result here makes the
application of the statute a question for the trier of fact in each case, thereby
introducing marked uncertainty into commercial transactions which it would
seem require a high degree of stability especially in view of the tremendous
volume of checks handled by modern banks. Finally, the purpose of the
statute—to cause actions to be commenced within a definite time in order to
facilitate proof of substantive fact questions—is not well served by the
decision.
The UCC resolves this problem by precluding an action against the
bank unless the drawer discovers and reports the forged indorsement within
three years from the time the statement and vouchers are made available to
the drawer.8 This rule was established because it was felt that in the great
preponderance of cases the drawer will discover the forged indorsement
within three years and if in an exceptional case be does not, the balance in
favor of a mechanical termination of liability of the bank outweighs any
possible injustice to the drawer. In a state which has adopted the UCC
both issues of this case would be decided in favor of the drawee bank.
THOMAS DUPONT
Negotiable Instrument—Forged Signature—Recovery by Drawee Bank.
—Riggs Nat'l Bank. of Washington, D.C. v. Dade Fed. Say. and Loan
Assin. 1—The defendant bank received a check in the amount of $20,000
7 243 App. Div. 46, 276 N.Y. Supp. 341 (1st Dep't 1934) ; see also Bank of British
North America v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 91 N.Y. 106 (1883).
8 UCC § 4-406(4).
1 268 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1959).
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